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Etendant les mains hors du lit,  
Plume fut étonné de ne pas rencontrer lemur :  
„Tiens, pensa-t-il, les fourmis l’auront mangé…” et il se rendormit.2 
[Henri Michaux. 1930. Un certain Plume] 
 
Introduction 
A few years ago (while researching embodied cognition) I focused for some 
time on disorders of experience, which affect representation or beliefs 
regarding one’s own body. One of the most fascinating and dramatic disorders 
was somatoparaphrenia (sometimes also astomatognosia) (Feinberg 2002). 
This disorder is when the patient believes that, for example, his hand is his 
aunt’s or wife’s hand. Or he believes it to be an inanimate object or a pet.  
When I presented this issue during one a seminar pertaining to philosophy 
(not cognitive studies or psychiatry), I was met with disbelief. How is it 
possible for a person who is sound and rational in any other matter to be 
convinced that his or her hand is somebody else’s hand? Where does this 
belief come from? Why can the person not be convinced that he or she is 
wrong? Is it possible for a rational person to allow himself or herself such 
strange beliefs and, additionally, to have them for a long time in spite of so 
much accounting against the beliefs (Freeman et al. 2004)? After all, such 
a belief should be accompanied by a serious disturbance in thinking, not 
limited to this one (bodily) realm, and so on3.  
 
                                                             
1 language edition: Ewa Bodal. 
2 Stretching his hands out from the bed, / Plume was surprised not to encounter the wall. / "Hmm!" 
he thought, "The ants musthave eaten it…" and he went back to sleep. (H.M., Plume, transl. D. Ball) 
3 Such a problem pertains to monothematic delusions.  
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Such a strong reaction seemed very intriguing to me. This issue of AVANT was 
created in order to present the notion of delusions—what they are and how 
they are currently explained—in a more detailed manner. 
It was important to me that the articles should study delusions from various 
perspectives, so as to achieve a complete picture of the current state of 
research. It did not all work out. Many subjects have not been addressed (they 
will be mentioned at the end of the introduction), but the works we present 
contain some of the most interesting and dynamically developing notions in 
research on delusions. 
 
Contents of the Issue 
One of the leading and central figures in research on delusions, Max 
Coltheart4 (see Coltheart et al. 2011), presents and summarises his heretofore 
work in a short text. Miyazono and Bortolotti present an interesting argument 
aimed at the charges against the doxastic concept of delusions (Bortolotti 
2010). Adams, Brown and Friston showcase a predictive-Bayesian concept of 
delusions (see also Corlett et al. 2009; 2015). Young criticizes the current 
changes in the two-factor account of delusions and argues that the role of 
experience should not be dismissed within it. Kapusta presents an interesting, 
phenomenological approach to delusions, rooted in the classic works of Karl 
Jaspers (1913/1997).  
In the last article, Carruthers takes a look at delusions from a different 
perspective. He uses them in order to show the weakness of the sense of 
agency concept as proposed by Wegner (2002). The issue also contains an 
interview with Jakob Hohwy. In Hohwy’s still-recent book Predictive Mind 
(2013a), we can find an interesting, predictive approach to delusions (close to 
the one that Adams et al. present in the current volume of AVANT). Hohwy 
points towards the unobvious connections between delusions and illusions 
(see also Hohwy 2013b).  
Let us take a closer look at the aforementioned articles. 
In his summary/overview, Coltheart presents the development of his 
approach (the two-factor account of delusions), drawing attention to the 
neuropsychological research on delusions (the role of brain damage in the 
formation of delusions). He also addresses the differences between explaining 
monothematic and polythematic delusions (this differentiation is not analyzed 
in detail in the present volume). Additionally, he sketches the most promising 
issues in the current research on delusions.  
                                                             
4  If the author’s name is not otherwise annotated in the introduction, e.g. by the publication date, 
I am referring to a text published in the present issue of Avant. 
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Adams, Brown and Friston highlight the role of precision of predictions in 
the formation of delusions. They show that “[t]his precision is thought to be 
encoded by postsynaptic gain of neuronal populations reporting prediction 
errors—the principal or pyramidal cells of superficial cortical layers” (this 
issue). They analyze the neurochemical mechanism responsible for the 
aforementioned precision, whose dysfunctions leads to false inferences, false 
learning, and changes in generative models that can be responsible for the 
formation of delusions. They point to the important role that active inference 
(one of the ways of updating beliefs in the predictive system) plays in 
this process.  
Miyazono and Bortolotti show that the doxastic account of delusions (that is, 
the one claiming that delusions are beliefs), while popular among 
psychiatrists, seems particularly controversial for philosophers. They attempt 
a philosophical defense of this approach. They point out that that the strongest 
arguments against the doxastic account are (a) the argument from action 
guidance and (b) the argument from the causal role. Miyazono and Bortolotti 
claim that it is possible to refute these arguments. They show that many 
delusions guide actions, as well as weaken the role played by non-pathological 
beliefs in directing actions. Not every belief directs our actions. This is why 
they argue for the importance of the role of motivations (which is not taken 
into account by many critics). It is possible that the disorders of motivation are 
responsible for some delusions not directing our actions (see Bortolotti 2014). 
In the second case, they show that many delusions play the causal role 
of beliefs.  
Young criticizes Coltheart et al.’s more recent works for removing the key role 
of experience in the formation of delusions, which, according to him, make it 
impossible to correctly explain the process. In this context, he discusses the 
differences between the endorsement and explanationist approaches to 
delusions (see also Bortolotti 2013). At the end of the work, he argues for the 
interactionist approach to delusions.  
In his article, Kapusta highlights the specificity of a phenomenological 
approach to delusions. He puts particular emphasis on the roles of 
embodiment and intersubjectivity on the formation of delusions.  
Carruthers argues that a good theory of awareness of action and sense of 
agency should explain the delusion of alien control (usually experienced by 
schizophrenics); no other theory can be a good theory of sense of agency and 
action. From this perspective, Carruthers criticizes Wegner’s concept (2002). 
Although particular authors present differing approaches to delusions, the 
remarks and threads visible in their articles frequently interweave. Kapusta 
discusses delusions using the Capgras and Cotard delusions as an example. 
These are also referred to in the works of Young (Capgras delusion) and 
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Miyazono with Bortolotti (Cotard delusion). Adams et al. discuss in detail the 
predictive approach to delusions, but Miyazono and Bortolotti refer to this 
framing as a potential solution to the problems of the doxastic approach. 
Kapusta and Young focus on the role of experience in forming delusions, while 
Adams et al. and Carruthers discuss the connection between actions and 
delusions. These are only some of the threads connecting the articles 
showcased in the present volume. 
 
Further Research and Subsequent Views 
Further Research: As I have already mentioned, when conducting research 
into notions discussed in this volume, Miyazano (2014) and Bortolotti (2014) 
have published works that develop the doxastic approach to delusions, as well 
as the potential predictive framing of the mechanisms of delusion (Miyazono 
et al. 2014). Colthart with coworkers (Griffiths et al. 2014, 2015) have analyzed 
the relation between the two-factor approach and predictive approach. Adams 
(along with his past and current colleagues) adds subsequent elements to the 
predictive approach of the mechanisms of delusions (Adams et al. 2015; Moran 
et al. 2015; Perrinet et al. 2014; Vossel et al. 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2014). The 
current issue of AVANT may be an excellent introduction to these works.  
Subsequent Views: Obviously, not all interesting subjects could be touched 
upon in this short volume of AVANT. Besides Young’s work, we have not 
devoted particular attention to specific examples of delusions (delusions of 
persecution, bodily delusions such as the aforementioned somatoparaphrenia, 
etc.). We have not analyzed the differences between monothematic and 
polythematic delusions, and we did not mention the very interesting issues of 
folie a deux and mass delusions (Langdon 2013). However, all this may be yet 
to come. Perhaps this is an opportunity to create another issue of AVANT 
devoted to delusions? 
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